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Sir Geoffrey Palmer and Andrew Butler recently released their 
draft constitution for New Zealand, which joins a rich body 
of work on the subject of constitutional reform. It is in the 
area of local government that the document departs from 
much of the literature and the current government’s thinking 
on this important sector. 
but they include scope for central 
government to share tax revenues with 
local authorities. Under their proposal, 
Parliament would retain the right to 
pass regulatory responsibility to local 
government, but it must consult on 
any new local government mandate, 
and detail any extra financial and 
administrative costs associated with these 
responsibilities (Palmer and Butler, 2016, 
p.73). 
The proposed settings bear a close 
resemblance to the constitutional 
structure of the Netherlands and 
Switzerland, two countries whose 
governance arrangements are structured 
on a bottom-up rather than top-down 
basis (Krupp, 2016, pp.17-31).
Constitutional muddle
To those less familiar with the current 
constitutional arrangements of local 
government in New Zealand it may seem as 
if Palmer and Butler’s solution is begging 
a question. However, a closer examination 
of the country’s governance arrangements 
shows that many of the challenges facing 
New Zealand right now, such as declining 
housing affordability and pressure on 
local infrastructure, are caused or made 
worse by our constitutional arrangements.
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The Need for 
Localist  
Reforms
In short, Palmer and Butler propose 
that local government’s place in New 
Zealand’s decision-making structure be 
reorganised along localist lines, as seen 
in many European democracies. In these 
countries local authorities have their 
own distinct place in the constitution 
that is independent from that of central 
government. Palmer and Butler call for 
decision-making power to be based on the 
principle of subsidiarity, where decisions 
are made at the lowest appropriate level. 
As such, where government is concerned, 
local bodies would make local decisions, 
regional bodies would make regional 
decisions, and central bodies would be 
concerned with national-level decisions. 
Under their draft constitution, local 
authorities would manage their affairs 
independently within the areas of control 
ceded to them by Parliament, and guided 
by democratic community preference. 
Funding would predominantly come 
from the existing property rates system, 
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Before examining local government’s 
place in New Zealand’s legislative and 
constitutional structure, it is worthwhile 
describing how decision-making power is 
typically divided in developed countries. 
At one end of the spectrum are highly 
centralised countries, where the role 
of local government is limited to a set 
list of defined activities, principally 
the provision of local public goods. At 
the other end are more decentralised 
countries, where local government is 
regarded as an independent democratic 
entity in its own right. Pinpointing 
New Zealand’s place on this spectrum 
is difficult because to some degree 
local authorities are both agents and 
independent authorities at the same time. 
Under the Local Government Act 
2002 the purpose of local authorities 
is to ‘enable democratic local decision-
making and action by, and on behalf of, 
communities’ (s10). While conducting 
this duty, councils must also meet ‘the 
current and future needs of communities 
for good-quality local infrastructure, 
local public services, and performance 
of regulatory functions in a way that 
is most cost-effective for households 
and businesses’. This would imply to 
the casual reader of the act that local 
authorities in New Zealand reside on 
the devolved/independent side of the 
spectrum, wholly answerable to their 
communities. However, in the absence of 
a formal constitution, local government’s 
existence relies entirely on statute. As 
such, Parliament can – and does – pass 
on responsibilities to local authorities 
as part of the lawmaking process, which 
councils are obliged to accept. The 
Productivity Commission estimates that 
there are about 30 pieces of legislation 
that confer regulatory responsibilities on 
local government, and more by-laws are 
made under these statutes than under 
the Local Government Act (Productivity 
Commission, 2013, p.17). The scope 
of these activities ranges from building 
and construction standards to food and 
hygiene regulations, health hazards, the 
control of liquor and gambling activity, 
the storage of hazardous substances and 
waste management, to name but a few. 
These arrangements mean that New 
Zealand’s local authorities are positioned 
at both ends of the centralised–
decentralised local government 
spectrum at the same time. Notionally 
this arrangement should provide for 
double oversight, one where councils 
are democratically accountable to their 
communities, and also benefit from 
central government oversight and 
standard setting at the same time. In 
practice these governance arrangements 
fall far short of this ideal state, and 
could in some respects be described as 
dysfunctional. 
Accountability gap
One of the problems with this arrangement 
is that it creates an accountability gap 
between those who set policy and those 
who bear the effects and costs thereof. A 
clear example of this was the introduction 
of minimum drinking water standards by 
the Ministry of Health in 2005 (Ministry 
of Health, 2008). The policy forced many 
councils to upgrade their plants to meet 
this standard. The costs of compliance 
were estimated at between $309 million 
and $527 million, yet central government 
set aside only $150 million for this activity 
(CH2M Beca Ltd, 2010, p.82). The 
shortfall had to be funded out of local 
taxes, yet the communities were given 
little say in the setting of these standards. 
Some rural communities may have been 
happy to settle for less stringent standards 
than those set by central government, or to 
have upgraded their facilities over a longer 
time period, in order to lighten the tax 
burden on local ratepayers. These kinds 
of trade-offs, based on local preference, 
are not feasible with a one-size-fits-all 
approach to policy making. 
The Productivity Commission’s 
inquiry into local regulation shows 
that central government is likely to 
underweight the costs imposed on local 
communities as part of the legislative 
process. For example, the Treasury’s 
Regulatory Impact Assessment Team, 
which assesses regulatory impact 
statements, requires policymakers to 
consider the significant impacts or 
risks associated with legislative changes. 
In theory this requirement should 
include the costs and risks posed to 
local government, but in practice these 
are often overlooked (Productivity 
Commission, 2013, pp.102-3). 
Although the practice of passing 
unfunded or under-funded mandates 
is widespread, the true costs of the 
problem are unknown. One attempt to 
tally the costs imposed on councils by 
amendments to the Local Government Act 
2002, the Public Transport Management 
Act 2008, the Health (Drinking Water) 
Amendment Act 2007 and the Land 
Transport Management Amendment 
Act 2008 estimated that it would take an 
additional 720,000 hours of council staff 
time to meet them. Conservatively priced 
at the average hourly wage at the time, 
this represented $14 million in additional 
salary costs, and excludes $25 million of 
one-off consulting costs (Statistics New 
Zealand, 2009; PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
2009). The study did not explore how 
these costs are distributed between small 
and large local authorities.
Central government acknowledged 
this problem in its official response to the 
Productivity Commission, noting that 
‘improvements will be made to central 
government documentation, such as the 
Cabinet Office Manual, Cabinet Guide, 
Regulatory Impact Analysis Handbook 
and the Department of Internal Affairs 
The Productivity Commission’s inquiry 
into local regulation shows that central 
government is likely to underweight the 
costs imposed on local communities as 
part of the legislative process.
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“Policy Development Guidelines 
for Regulatory Functions Involving 
Local Government”’ (New Zealand 
Government, 2014). 
Blame game
The current governance structure also 
allows councils to shift the blame for 
poor local performance onto central 
government. Rapidly rising house prices 
in Auckland are often blamed on the 
Resource Management Act (Bassett and 
Malpass, 2013, p.5). This legislation has 
certainly made it more difficult to build 
in New Zealand’s biggest city by making 
subdivision of land more difficult, but 
the problem has been made significantly 
worse by the city’s urban growth limit. 
This zoning rule, which delineates urban 
and rural land at the edge of the city, was 
found by one study to increase the cost of 
residential land by between eight and 13 
times relative to that of equivalent rural 
land parcels of a similar size just outside 
the boundary (Grimes and Liang, 2007, 
p.31). Nowhere in the RMA are councils 
required to put urban boundary limits in 
place; it is a local policy preference. 
The quality of local council decision 
making is also highly questionable. 
Under section 32(2) of the RMA, local 
authorities are required to assess the 
costs and benefits of any major spending 
item proposed in the district plan. To an 
economist this would imply a systematic 
measure of the expected net benefits 
of a proposal for affected members of 
a community. In practice many of the 
section 32 analyses do not meet this 
standard. For example, in the Käpiti 
Coast District Council’s ten-year plan, the 
cost–benefit analysis that accompanies 
the infrastructure, services and associated 
resource use section amounts to little 
more than a list of what might or might 
not be costs and benefits (Käpiti Coast 
District Council, 2012). This listing 
process may be appropriate where the 
expense of a professional cost–benefit 
analysis is not justified based on the 
scale of the activity, but councils can still 
commission a professional cost–benefit 
assessment of the entire ten-year plan, as 
Auckland Council did with the Unitary 
Plan (Nixon et al., 2013). Unfortunately, 
Auckland is an exception.
This lack of transparency and 
accountability on both sides of the 
central–local divide could to some 
degree explain local voter disengagement. 
Preliminary estimates suggest that only 
41.8% of eligible voters cast a ballot in 
the 2016 local government elections. 
This was marginally higher than the 
41.3% turnout in 2013, but well down 
on 57% turnout in 1989 (Department of 
Internal Affairs, 2013; Local Government 
New Zealand, 2016). The public’s 
dissatisfaction is not limited to the ballot 
box either. Attitudinal surveys rate the 
overall performance of the sector at 29% 
(Local Government New Zealand, 2015). 
Political intransigence
This distrust of local government 
appears to manifest itself as political 
intransigence, where communities 
resist moves by councils to increase 
rates, borrow more or sell assets to fund 
investments that should benefit residents 
in the long term by growing the ratepayer 
base (Krupp and Wilkinson, 2015, p.29). 
Community resistance to higher taxes or 
great council borrowing is not surprising, 
but it is perplexing that fast-growing 
communities like Queenstown are not 
making greater use of debt to pay for 
infrastructure investments (total term 
debt was equivalent to 6% of assets in 
2014) (ibid., p.53). Fast-growing areas, 
like Auckland, have higher term debt to 
asset ratios – in Auckland 14% in 2014, 
near the statutory borrowing limit – but 
the city also held investments equivalent 
to 556.1% of infrastructure assets in 2014 
(ibid., p.46). Selling these assets to pay for 
infrastructure investments or to service 
debt has been labelled ‘a hot political issue’ 
by the city’s former mayor, Len Brown, 
suggesting that it will be unlikely or at 
least very difficult for the city to divest 
itself of these assets to fund infrastructure 
development or pay off long-term debt.
A concern is that the current situation 
may worsen. The lack of transparency 
and accountability at a local level may 
increase voter intransigence, which 
in turn is likely to frustrate central 
government’s efforts to encourage faster 
economic growth. Central government’s 
response may be to legislate around 
political roadblocks, further blurring the 
lines of accountability, transparency and 
local choice, forming a vicious policy 
circle. 
This is already playing out to some 
extent. The 2012 amendments to the 
Local Government Act made it easier 
for local parties to propose local council 
amalgamations in their area. Three 
such applications to merge councils 
in Northland, Greater Wellington and 
Hawke’s Bay regions were made under 
this legislation. The Northland and 
Greater Wellington proposals failed 
to win sufficient popular support to 
proceed to a poll, and the Hawke’s Bay 
amalgamation proposal was voted down 
by a ratio of 2:1 (Local Government 
Commission, 2015; Hawke’s Bay Today, 
2015). Central government’s response 
was to table further amendments to the 
Local Government Act. Should these 
amendments become law, it will make 
it easier for councils and the Local 
Government Commission to propose 
amalgamations and consolidations 
of local council assets into regional 
council-controlled organisations. Many 
in the local government sector see this 
as an attempt to legislate around local 
preferences.
Under the separation of powers laid 
out by Palmer and Butler, each tier 
of government would be pre-eminent 
within the sphere of its constitutionally 
mandated duties.
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Constitutional remedies
A constitutional separation of powers 
would go a long way to remedying these 
problems. Under the separation of powers 
laid out by Palmer and Butler, each tier 
of government would be pre-eminent 
within the sphere of its constitutionally 
mandated duties. Were the costs of a 
locally provided public service to suddenly 
rise, or quality deteriorate, the affected 
community would immediately know 
which agency was responsible. Likewise, 
communities would be directly faced 
with the costs of their decisions (taxes) 
and the consequences of their decisions 
(approving poor policies). The transfer 
of authority is low-risk, as the majority of 
these tasks are largely already managed by 
local authorities, such as the provision of 
roading, water and other services.
Where there are benefits from central 
government passing regulatory tasks to 
local authorities, the draft constitution 
stipulates a mechanism by which the cost 
this would impose on communities is 
made transparent. Where these costs are 
deemed to be greater than the benefits, 
local authorities, given the power to 
‘manage their own affairs independently 
within subject-matters established in Acts 
of Parliament’ (Palmer and Butler, 2016, 
p.73), should be within their rights to 
reject these policies. Even if councils are 
not given the ability to opt out, greater 
transparency about the costs that central 
government imposed on communities 
should provide greater oversight and 
scrutiny of these mandates.
Conceptually, the constitutional 
reforms proposed by Palmer and Butler 
would go a long way to resolving the 
blurred lines of accountability and mixed 
responsibilities that currently exist. It is 
notable that New Zealand is one of the 
few countries in the world that does 
not have a written constitution (New 
Zealand’s constitutional arrangements 
are codified in numerous pieces of 
legislation). However, those looking 
to improve on the local government 
arrangements through a formal written 
constitution are unlikely to find much 
success any time soon. Palmer and 
Butler’s work shows that there is interest 
in a written constitution, but it is largely 
confined to academia. Appetite among 
the public and policymakers is low. 
Research by Rachael Jones shows 
that various attempts have been made 
by government to begin this process 
over the past two decades, to little 
avail. These include the Building the 
Constitution conference, which was 
hosted in Parliament in 2000, and 
the Constitutional Arrangements 
Committee, which was established in 
2005 (Jones, 2013, pp.14-15). The former 
failed to achieve any ‘general consensus’ 
on constitutional reform. The latter 
produced a report which recommended 
that government avoid a constitutional 
debate for fear of stirring disagreement 
and division in the community. 
More recently, the National-led 
government, which was elected into 
power in 2008, agreed to set up a 
framework to review New Zealand’s 
constitutional arrangements as part of 
its confidence and supply agreements 
with the ACT, United Future and Mäori 
parties. This led to the formation of the 
Constitutional Advisory Panel in 2011. 
The panel finished its recommendations 
in November 2013; they included 
that New Zealand wrap up its various 
constitutional protections (such as 
those contained in the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act 1990) in one statute 
(Constitutional Advisory Panel, 2013, 
p.22). The panel’s recommendations were 
not binding, and at the time of writing 
government has not issued an official 
response.
Contractual workaround
Developments in the United Kingdom, 
however, suggest there are other means of 
achieving the same ends as the Palmer–
Butler written constitution. Like New 
Zealand, the United Kingdom does not 
have a constitution, but the country has 
opted to devolve powers to city-regions on 
a contractual basis. The first and most well-
known of these is the Greater Manchester 
‘city deal’. Under this arrangement central 
government has devolved a number of 
powers and responsibilities to the city-
region, a regional body made up of 
ten constituent local councils (Greater 
Manchester Combined Authority, n.d.). 
The powers and responsibilities conferred 
include control over health and social 
programmes, housing and planning, skills 
and employment development, and the 
setting and collecting of business rates 
(Krupp, 2016, p.15). This deal provides 
some of the outcomes that the Palmer–
Butler constitution would achieve. The 
Greater Manchester Combined Authority 
is contractually assured that it has full 
control over the policy areas devolved 
to it, guided by democratic preference. 
Officials in Whitehall can of course use 
parliamentary power to amend the terms 
of the deal, and again dictate standards at 
the local level, but it would not be without 
political cost.
In some respects the malleable nature 
of these arrangements is preferable to a 
constitution. Once enacted, constitutions 
are robust legal documents, and require 
a high measure of public support to 
change. Should the local government 
arrangements proposed by Palmer and 
Butler prove to be a poor structure for 
deciding local matters, it would be a very 
difficult and slow process to reverse. A 
contractual arrangement, on the other 
hand, could be reversed, and quickly, by 
mutual agreement.
Furthermore, a constitutional 
separation between central and local 
government achieved by contract could 
be changed as the capacity of councils 
change. It would also allow central 
Like New Zealand, the United Kingdom 
does not have a constitution, but the 
country has opted to devolve powers to 
city-regions on a contractual basis.
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government to tailor the handover of 
powers according to different types of 
councils, as opposed to taking a one-size-
fits-all approach.
Precedent for this kind of contractual 
devolution already exists in New Zealand. 
Under the Waikato-Tainui Raupatu 
Claims (Waikato River) Settlement Act 
2010, the Crown handed a group of iwi 
the power to set the strategic direction of 
management of the Waikato River. This 
power was previously held by Waikato 
Regional Council. Under the act, local 
authorities have to ensure that regional, 
coastal and district plans align with the 
vision and strategy set by iwi. Notably, 
iwi decisions supersede national and 
coastal policy statements, two areas 
under central control (Local Government 
New Zealand, 2011, pp.19-20). If this 
kind of arrangement can be established 
with iwi, the same framework can surely 
be used to achieve a separation of powers 
between central and local government.
Conclusion
In concluding, it is worth restating 
the problem that the contractual or 
constitutional reforms would both 
address. That is to fix the dysfunctional 
aspects of the relationship between 
central government and local authorities 
that has been created by the way New 
Zealand structures its governance affairs. 
This relationship is characterised by poor 
lines of accountability and overlapping 
regulatory responsibilities. This makes it 
difficult for the public to tell which tier of 
government is ultimately responsible for 
which service. The same arrangements 
mean central government gives too little 
consideration to the costs its policies 
impose on local communities and, in 
turn, allow councils to blame their poor 
performance and decision making on 
central government. The effects are high 
levels of frustration among communities 
who live under, and pay for, these 
governance arrangements.
One means of addressing this would 
be to formally stipulate the respective 
roles of local government in a written 
constitution, as proposed by Palmer and 
Butler. The lack of public and political 
appetite for a constitutional discussion, 
however, suggests that this process may 
not be achievable any time soon. This 
need not derail much-needed local 
government reform, as the devolution 
process in the United Kingdom, and 
specifically Greater Manchester, shows. 
Unlike a constitutional discussion, there 
is great interest among the public and 
policymakers in improving the efficiency 
and effectiveness of local government. 
Making local councils more accountable 
to the communities they serve is a means 
of getting there.
1  Local Government Act 2002 Amendment Bill (No 2)
The Need for Localist Reforms
Bassett, M. and L. Malpass (2013) Priced Out: how New Zealand lost its 
housing affordability, Wellington: The New Zealand Initiative
CH2M Beca Ltd (2010) Drinking Water Standards New Zealand Cost 
Benefit Analysis: engineering input, Wellington: CH2M Beca Ltd for 
the Ministry of Health
Constitutional Advisory Panel (2013) New Zealand’s Constitution: a report 
on a conversation, Wellington: New Zealand Government
Department of Internal Affairs (2013) ‘Local authority election 
statistics 2013’, https://www.dia.govt.nz/diawebsite.nsf/wpg_URL/
Services-Local-Elections-Local-Authority-Election-Statistics-
2013?OpenDocument
Greater Manchester Combined Authority (n.d.) Greater Manchester 
City Deal, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/221014/Greater-Manchester-City-Deal-final_0.pdf
Grimes, A. and Y. Liang (2007) Spatial Determinants of Land Prices in 
Auckland: does the metropolitan urban limit have an effect?, working 
paper 07-09, Wellington: Motu Economic and Public Policy Research
Hawke’s Bay Today (2015) ‘Big NO in amalgamation referendum’, 
Hawke’s Bay Today, 15 September, http://www.nzherald.co.nz/hawkes-
bay-today/news/article.cfm?c_id=1503462&objectid=11513412
Jones, R. (2013) ‘The problem of constitutional law reform in New 
Zealand: a comparative analysis’, LLB (Honours) dissertation, 
University of Otago
Käpiti Coast District Council (2012) Käpiti Coast District Plan Review 
Section 32 Analysis: summary report: infrastructure, services and 
associated resource use (part 1: infrastructure and network utilities), 
Wellington: Kāpiti Coast District Council
Krupp, J. (2016) The Local Benchmark: when smaller is better, 
Wellington: The New Zealand Initiative
Krupp, J. and B. Wilkinson (2015) The Local Formula: myths, facts and 
challenges, Wellington: The New Zealand Initiative
Local Government New Zealand (2011) Local Authorities and Mäori: case 
studies of local arrangements, Wellington: Local Government New 
Zealand
Local Government Commission (2015) ‘Amalgamation decisions: 
Wellington and Northland’, http://www.lgc.govt.nz/commission-
news-and-contact-information/media-statements-and-speeches/
amalgamation-decisions-wellington-and-northland/
Local Government New Zealand (2015) Building a Stronger Local 
Government for New Zealand: a survey of New Zealanders’ perceptions 
of local government 2015, Wellington: Local Government New 
Zealand
Local Government New Zealand (2016) ‘Preliminary voter turnout 2016’, 
http://www.lgnz.co.nz/vote2016/preliminary-voter-turnout-2016
Ministry of Health (2008) Drinking-water Standards for New Zealand 
2005 (Revised 2008), Wellington: Ministry of Health
New Zealand Government (2014) ‘Government response to 
recommendations of the Productivity Commission’s report Towards 
Better Local Regulation’, Wellington: New Zealand Government
Nixon, C., P. Clough, R. Peterson and M. Douché (2013) Section 32 
RMA Report of the Auckland Unitary Plan, Wellington: New Zealand 
Institute of Economic Research
Palmer, G. and A. Butler (2016) A Constitution for Aotearoa New Zealand, 
Wellington: Victoria University Press
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2009) Costs of Regulation on Local Government, 
Wellington: PricewaterhouseCoopers for Local Government New 
Zealand 
Productivity Commission (2013) Towards Better Local Regulation, 
Wellington: New Zealand Productivity Commission
Statistics New Zealand (2009) ‘New Zealand income survey: June 2009 
quarter’, http://www.stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/income-and-work/
Income/NZIncomeSurvey_HOTPJun09qtr/Commentary.aspx
References
